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The New Chemical Weapons Convention: Implementa-
tion and Prospects. Edited by Michael Bothe, 
Natalino Ronzitti, and Allan Rosas. The Hague, 
London, Boston: Kluwer Law International, 
1998. Pp.xv, 604. Index.FI 350,$189,£119. 
This book, a fine-grained, expert-level analysis 
of several of the most intricate legal and policy 
issues arising in connection with the 1993 Chemi-
cal Weapons Convention (CWC) , also serves as a 
vivid symbol of the "coming of age" of arms 
control. For all their strategic significance and 
political innovation, earlier generations of arms 
control treaties-bilateral or multilateral, con-
cerning nuclear, chemical, biological, or other 
weapons-could not plausibly have spawned this 
type of 600-page exegesis or inspired the pains-
taking, inch-by-inch explorations presented in its 
twenty-three chapters. Only with the modem 
wave of treaty craftsmanship-embodying at-
tempts to incorporate into the document itself 
reams of detail, scores of implementation proce-
dures, and page after page of minutiae that had 
traditionally been left to subsequent phases-has 
the arms control community been able to gener-
ate a treaty of sufficient scope and detail to justify 
this level of dissection. It remains to be seen, 
however, whether this refinement of treaty-mak-
ing mechanisms is salutary or detrimental. Will it 
improve the arms control process by helping to 
anticipate, and perhaps thereby to avoid, 
otherwise-latent controversies over verification 
procedures, dispute-resolution mechanisms, and 
other operational specifics? Or do the monu-
mental demands of such a process represent a 
level of hypertrophy that threatens the sustain-
ability of the entire enterprise by so burdening 
the treaty negotiators that they can only rarely 
surmount all the challenges thrown their way 
and bring such an instrument to fruition? 
If the Chemical Weapons Convention repre-
sents something of a high-water mark in detail-
laden treaty drafting, then the editors of this text 
(Michael Bothe, a professor of law at Johann 
Wolfgang Goethe-University in Frankfurt; Natali-
no Ronzitti of the Instituto di Affari Interna-
zionali in Rome; and Allan Rosas, director of the 
Institute for Human Rights atAbo Akademi Uni-
versity in Turku, Finland) have at least marked 
the occasion in a suitably rich, insightful-and 
encyclopedic-manner. 
The book arose from a series of workshops 
convened in Germany, Italy, and Finland in 
1991-92. The contributors, most of whom are 
professors or researchers affiliated with various 
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universities or institutes in those countries, are
experts representing a diverse range of perspec-
tives and disciplines within the field of chemical
weapons. The book is well-organized, and the
chapters not only complement each other, but
avoid most of the problems of overlap that
frequently afflict such anthologies. It covers a
broad range of topics, from "big picture" and
background questions, to issues about the cre-
ation and operation of the treaty's implementing
organization, to the mechanisms designed to
ensure verification of compliance with the
treaty's fundamental obligations.
Three chapters will be of particular interest.
First, Thomas Kurzidem has supplied a remark-
ably insightful guide to the conflict-management
standards and procedures of the CWC. Article IX
(Consultations, Cooperation and Fact-Finding)
andArticle XIV (SettlementofDisputes) provide
a state-of-the-art elaboration of the treaty provi-
sions that the parties can employ to avoid dis-
agreements in the first place, that channel par-
ties into more cooperative and problem-solving
modes when disagreements do arise, and that
provide recourse to whatever "teeth" the interna-
tional law system has to offer for the most intrac-
table cases.
Kurzidem's chapter admirably provides the
readerwith asubtle understanding of the context
within which the treaty-implementation problems
may arise. He starts by analyzing the (mostly quite
primitive) efforts of prior arms control instru-
ments, such as the Antarctic Treaty, the Treaty of
Tlatelolco, and even the Non-Proliferation Treaty,
each of which, despite their myriad accomplish-
ments and inventions, failed to establish reliable,
expansive procedures to anticipate or address
emerging compliance problems. Building upon
this empirical survey, he then catalogues the ar-
ray of dispute settlement mechanisms that have
been grafted onto the existing inventory of arms
control accords: bilateral or multilateral consulta-
tions, institutional fact-finding, challenge inspec-
tions, and so on, the sum of which, Kurzidem
notes laconically, "constitutes a very reluctant ap-
proach to third party dispute settlement" (p. 294).
In contrast, the Chemical Weapons Conven-
tion offers a diverse range of viable options. At
the foundation is a verification program so rigor-
ous that potential disputes may be preempted
even before they emerge. If problems do arise, a
"ladder" of clarification, consultation, and dispute-
resolution routes channel the controversies into
productive forums. The aggrieved (or merely
'concerned") party may select its options with
considerable freedom; there is no established
hierarchy or prescribed sequence in which the
various mechanisms must be invoked. Thus,
exchanges of information, requests for clarifica-
tion, recourse to the institutional arrangements
and organs established by the treaty, and referral
to the International Court of Justice are all
available. Kurzidem not only describes the
choices, but critiques them. He notes, for exam-
ple, the unfortunately truncated powers available
to the "experts group" that might be appointed
to assist the parties in assessing the adequacy of
exchanged information.
A second valuable chapter is that contributed
by Ettore Greco on the CWC's novel "confidenti-
ality" provisions. As Greco notes, modern arms
control agreements have become so ambitious,
and the subjects they address have become so
diverse, thatverification arrangements must now
encompass both government facilities and, with
equal intrusiveness, the domain of private indus-
try. The CWC's innovative mechanisms for "man-
aged access" by the international inspectorate (a
process of sufficient importance to be discussed
in several chapters) might therefore threaten to
expose both classified information concerning
national security and confidential business infor-
mation zealously protected by private industry.
He provides a lucid and detailed explanation of
the CWC's elaborate safeguards against compro-
mising such information, and of the specific rem-
edies provided when violations occur.
Greco begins by sketching the comparable
structures available in other arms control regimes,
especially those created by the International
Atomic EnergyAgency's safeguards system, which
have been asignal success in providing the neces-
sary insight into parties' treaty-related activities
while not compromising other data. Greco re-
minds us, however, that the CWC will present the
potential dangers in much sharper relief. The
quantity of data to be exchanged is much greater;
the degree of intrusion into private-sector indus-
trial operations is much more intense; and the
market value of the confidential commercial in-
formation at risk is immense.
Greco argues that the CWC should be equal to
the task. The treaty's Confidentiality Annex spells
out in elaborate detail how the inspectors will
operate, what procedural protections will be in
place for the acquired information, and how the
balance will be struck between the international
community's "need to know" about suspicious or
problematic activities, and the facility's need to
protect itself against unwarranted snooping.
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Greco is a most thoughtful commentator in ana-
lyzing both the treaty's provisions and its negoti-
ating history. He points out, for example, that
the treaty permits only states parties-and not
private facilities that are subject to inspection-
to author proposals for protecting proprietary
business information.
A third especially impressive chapter is that
contributed byAllan Rosas, one of the co-editors,
who discusses the array of possible responses to
noncompliance with the Convention. The task
Rosas sets for himself is to parse Article XII of
the CWC, which outlines a range of "Measures to
Redress a Situation and to Ensure Compliance,
including Sanctions." He notes that the treaty's
aims here embrace both punishment (to impose
a penalty on the violator, thereby deterring sim-
ilar deviations) and enforcement (to restore the
status quo ante). The treaty draws upon a number
of substantive remedies, again selecting among
the best and most promising types of enforcement
actions that have been developed in prior genera-
tions of arms control agreements. None of these,
it must be admitted, is perfectly satisfactory; the
nations of the world have not yet demonstrated
a sincere willingness to turn fully to legal tools
for resolving problems in this most sensitive
arena, national security. Consequently, if Rosas's
explication is not fully persuasive on the powers
of the CWC to enforce its provisions (especially
when confronted with a determined violation by
some rogue state) and thereby guarantee each of
its parties the "benefit of the bargain," he can
hardly be blamed. It is, instead, a reflection of
the inherent inadequacy of the treaty, or even of
the entire system of international law, which has
notyet inspired fully effective legal enforcement.
Other chapters of the book must also be noted,
at least in passing. The contribution by Julian
Perry Robinson is an excellent historical overview
of the negotiations that culminated in the CWC;
it could almost stand alone as an entry in a
suitable encyclopedia explaining how the instru-
ment came to take its final shape. A chapter by
Michael Bothe, another of the co-editors, de-
scribes the national implementing legislation
crafted by several of the states parties. Of particu-
lar interest is the chapter's topic-by-topic analysis
of the domestic laws of several leading coun-
tries-information that is otherwise very difficult
to collect and synthesize. Finally, the chapters by
Ronald Sutherland and Thomas Stock are valu-
able interdisciplinary examinations of the prob-
lems of, and prospects for, destroying both the
active chemical weapons inventories of parties,
and the old and abandoned chemical weapons
detritus they may yet uncover.
Despite its many virtues, the book has several
problems. Most important is the unfortunate
timing of the book's publication. As noted, most
of the essays were based in workshops conducted
in 1991 and 1992, at which time the Chemical
Weapons Convention was taking its final shape.
Since it had not been completely drafted or
signed, the outcome, especially with regard to
implementation measures, was still uncertain.
After the CWC was signed in Paris, many of the
essays were updated in a modest way to take new
developments into account, such as the initial
activities of the Preparatory Commission that
paved the way for the treaty to enter into force in
1997. Nevertheless, there has been by now-
nearly seven years after the book's chapters were
completed in 1993-a wealth of developments
concerning the CWC and its implementation.
The Preparatory Commission and the perma-
nent institutions of the CWC have taken shape
and begun to find their way. Some of the au-
thors' speculations about what the treaty organs
might or might not do have already been ren-
dered obsolete and need to be supplemented.
Although the experts contributing to this book
bring an admirable range of perspectives to it,
still broader levels of diversity might have been
helpful and illuminating. There are no voices
representing the United States or Russia, the two
countries possessing the lion's share of the treaty-
relevant chemical weapons, installations, and
materials. There is also no contributor represent-
ing the developing world, which played a leading
role in the negotiation of many of the Conven-
tion's provisions. Unfortunately, too, there are no
genuine skeptics among the authors, no one pre-
pared to argue that the CWC is, for example,
inadequate to the assigned tasks or doomed to
fail in its ambitious undertakings.
One comment about the text itself is also in
order. Most of the chapters are skillfully and well
written, but there are places where an additional
round of editing and proofreading would have
smoothed out the lingering roughness of expres-
sion or idiom.
Overall, this book is an excellent addition to the
literature and should be welcome in any collec-
tion that seeks to encourage a careful, thorough
understanding ofwhat is now the discipline's most
sophisticated, highly developed arms control
treaty. The book is a most suitable vade mecum
for anyone who seeks a painstaking guide to the
entrails of the Chemical Weapons Convention,
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who wants to compare its provisions to those of 
prior (or subsequent) arms control accords, or 
who undertakes to study the process by which 
arms control agreements of this sort are crafted. 
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